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Abstract
The assumption that preferences are transitive, or, roughly equivalently, that choice behavior
satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, is at the core of much classical normative
decision theory. This paper asks to what degree this restricts the possible outcomes of choice
behavior: are there objectives that could not be attained by an agent adhering to WARP that
could be attained by choices that would be said to be "intransitive"? It is argued that the
answer to this question is "no" in one setting of choice under random budget sets; any
outcome obtained by intransitive choice methods can also be obtained by transitive ones.
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The classical, “rational” decision-making agent of economic theory typically is
assumed to possess preferences which satisfy transitivity: for any three goods a, b,
and c, if a is weakly preferred to b and b is weakly preferred to c, then a must be
weakly preferred to c. Under some weak assumptions, this is essentially equivalent
to requiring the agent to exhibit choice behavior that satisﬁes the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP): if the agent is willing to choose a in some budget set
in which a and b are oﬀered, then, in any other budget set also containing a and b,
if the agent is willing to choose b, he must also be willing to choose a.
Fishburn (1991) points out that the arguments against intransitive relations or
cyclical choice behavior fall into two categories: one, that intransitivities complicate
the analysis of individual behavior, and two, that such preferences are “irrational”
and subject to exploitation. In this second category falls the so-called “money
pump.” An agent who truly adhered to preferences with a violation of the tran-
sitivity assumption could be systematically exploited, indeﬁnitely, at no cost to the
exploiter. But, in order to begin such an exploitation, it would have to be observed
that the agent had such preferences. If one considers the decision-making apparatus
of a biological being as a product of evolution, one can imagine that adhering to such
“inconsistent” choice procedures would rarely be exploited in nature. Aside from this
informational requirement, Fishburn points out that the money pump commingles
static and dynamic arguments: in particular, an agent who was exploited once by this
argument surely would revise their choice behavior the second time around, or the
third.1 Given these observations, there might be little real cost in following a choice
rule at a given point in time that would violate transitivity, especially in a complex
environment where the cost of evaluation of diﬀerent outcomes might outweigh its
beneﬁts.
Given that the case can be made that this normative argument for transitivity has
little bite in practice, this paper asks the complementary question. If the expected
“cost,” measured by the small possibility of exploitation, to intransitivity is small,
could it be the case that there is some positive beneﬁt to using a choice procedure
that would violate, or appear to violate, a suitable version of WARP? In the presence
of possible intransitivity, deﬁning the word “beneﬁt” can be tricky. For the purposes
of this analysis, “beneﬁt” will be operationalized as follows: can the admission of
intransitivities expand the feasible set of consumption outcomes?
In static settings, the results of Epstein (1987) and Kim (1987) answer this ques-
1Mandler (2005) provides another critique of the money pump, in which apparent violations of
revealed preference arise from a distinction between “psychological” and “revealed” preferences.
1tion negatively. Both give results stating that any observed demand function can
be rationalized using a transitive preference ordering, under some assumptions. The
former places a separability assumption on preferences, while the latter uses semi-
transitivity or pseudotransitivity conditions.
This paper complements these results in a setting where the choices of an agent
are observed over time. In each period, the budget set is determined stochastically,
and the agent is observed to make a choice from the realized budget set. This can
be interpreted as a low-level model of choice, in which overall consumption is the
aggregation of relatively small individual choices, where the frequency with which
choices are made is fast relative to any discounting by the agent. In parallel to
the existing results noted above, it is shown that the agent can achieve any feasible
long-run pattern without resorting to behavior that would appear to the observer
to violate WARP. In this environment, any feasible consumption pattern can be
achieved entirely through the use of stationary strategies involving choice behavior
that satisfy suitable notions of transitivity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the formal model in more
detail. Section 3 presents the results, including a geometric interpretation of choice
rules, by which it is seen how the transitive choice rules “span” the intransitive ones.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the results.
2 Model
Following a model by Piotrowski and Makowski (2005), suppose there are a ﬁnite
number N of goods. At each point in time t = 1,2,3,..., the agent is presented with
a budget set of two goods drawn from this set, from which the agent may choose
exactly one to consume. Consumption within each period is indivisible. The pair of
goods available is chosen randomly according to some probability distribution known
to the agent. Probabilities of presentation of a budget set will be denoted by suitably
subscripted q’s. The process is stationary; the presentation probabilities do not
change with time, and do not depend on previous choices. The question is whether
the agent can attain any long-run distribution of consumption w = (w1,...,wN),
where w ≥ 0 and
 N
i=1 wi = 1. Thus, the length of each period t can be thought
of as being “small” relative to the consumption horizon. This is similar to the use
of time-average payoﬀs in repeated game theory; see, for example, Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991, chapter 5) for discussion and cites.
It will turn out that the general result will follow from the case with only three
goods, so the notation can be specialized. Consider three goods, numbered 1, 2, and
23, and the corresponding three budget sets B1 = {2,3}, B2 = {1,3}, and B3 = {1,2};
let q1, q2, and q3 be their probabilities of presentation, respectively. Note that budget
sets are numbered by the good which is absent. Then, there are eight possible choice
functions, given in Table 1. Functions f3 and f6 exhibit a cyclical behavior that
makes it impossible to extend these functions in such a way that would not violate
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.2
Table 1: The eight choice functions. Note that f3 and f6 exhibit a cycle.
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
B1 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
B2 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3
B3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
In this environment, in order to obtain a particular long-run w, it will in general
be necessary to choose randomly for some budget sets. Let pk, k = 1,...,8 be the
probability that function fk is adopted at any given time. Again, pk is assumed to
be stationary over time.
Then, the condition that a given vector of probabilities p = (pk)8
k=1 achieves the
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It is assumed that equation (1) has a solution; that is, that there exists some feasible
way to obtain w. Since this linear system has more unknowns than equations, if a
solution exists, then inﬁnitely many solutions exist.
3 Results
The goal is to further characterize the solutions p to equation (1). In particular,
2WARP has no bite in this environment, since the protasis never holds when considering only
two-element budget sets. However, for functions f3 and f6, it would not be possible to specify a
choice for the budget set {1,2,3} that would not violate WARP. Even though three-element budget
sets are not considered in this analysis, behavior will be deemed to “violate” WARP if the choice
functions could not be extended to satisfy WARP for the three-element case.
3it is argued that, while there are solutions p that involve the adoption of choice
behavior that exhibit cycles, the long-run consumption obtained by those solutions p
can also be obtained by other solutions p′ which place zero weight on choice behavior
with cycles. Furthermore, p can be chosen such that the agent would not appear to
an observer to violate a statistical version of WARP, which will be shown to be a
strictly stronger condition. The former result is a statement about choice behavior
at any given period, while the latter can be viewed as a statement about consistency
of choice behavior over time. The results are presented in turn in the next two
subsections.
3.1 The cyclical choice functions add no feasible bundles
The ﬁrst result shows that the cyclical functions f3 and f6 are never required in
order to obtain any w. That is to say, there is never any advantage to adopting with
positive probability a choice function at any given time that would violate WARP.
Proposition 1 If N = 3, and if the vector w is feasible, there exist distributions p
solving equation (1) that give probability zero to the functions f3 and f6. In addition,
any feasible vector w can be obtained by randomizing over a support of at most three
choice functions.
Proof For ease of exposition, the argument is presented geometrically. The space of
consumption bundles w is presented as the simplex in Figure 1. The eight points on
the simplex correspond to one of the eight choice functions fk; the feasible consump-
tion bundles, then, are the points on the simplex which can be attained by taking
convex combinations of these points. The six functions which could be extended in
such a way as to satisfy WARP are located on the boundaries of the simplex, forming
a hexagon. The functions f3 and f6 are located interior to this hexagon. Thus, if
there is a vector p solving equation (1) such that p3 > 0 or p6 > 0, then there exists
another solution such that p3 = p6 = 0. In other words, whatever choices are being
made when using f3 and f6 can be “synthesized” using only acyclic choice functions.
The hexagon formed by the points corresponding to the six choice functions
satisfying WARP are exactly the vectors w which are feasible. By inspection, all
such points lie within at least one triangle generated by exactly three of the extreme
points. Thus, any w can be obtained by using at most three choice functions with
positive probability. ￿
4Corollary 1 For all ﬁnite N, if the vector w is feasible, there exist distributions
p over the choice functions that give probability zero to the functions that violate
WARP.
Proof Observe ﬁrst that if a cycle exists over four or more goods and budget sets,
then there must be a cycle within those goods consisting of exactly three of the
goods over three budget sets. Without loss of generality, call those goods 1, 2, and 3.
Then, apply the argument of Proposition 1, using the eight choice functions which
prescribe behavior on the budget sets {1,2}, {1,3}, and {2,3} as in Table 1, and
which agree on all other budget sets. ￿
3.2 A stronger dynamic consistency result
The previous result illuminates geometrically why the cyclical choice functions f3
and f6 add nothing to the feasible set of long-run consumption bundles w. Yet, it
could be argued that this is of little use in practice, since what one would observe in
this setting is not the choice functions adopted by the agent, but rather the choices
that result from those functions.
This section strengthens the result by showing that the agent can achieve any
feasible w by adopting a stationary choice strategy that would satisfy, in a stochastic
sense, the self-consistency ideas embodied in WARP. Let P(x;B) be the probability
some good x ∈ B is chosen from a budget set B.
Deﬁnition 1 Observed choice behavior satisﬁes stochastic WARP if, for any
three goods A, B, C, and any three choice sets α ⊇ {A,B}, β ⊇ {B,C}, and
γ ⊇ {A,C}, the conditions
P(A;α) > P(B;α) and P(B;β) > P(C;β) and P(C;γ) > P(A;γ)
are not jointly satisﬁed.
Then, the result of Proposition 1 can be strengthened as follows.
Proposition 2 For any feasible w, there exist distributions p over the choice func-
tions that satisfy both equation (1) and stochastic WARP. Furthermore, stochastic
WARP is strictly stronger than just requiring pk = 0 for all choice functions fk that
do not individually satisfy WARP.
Proof By symmetry, there are only three types of support for p to consider:
51. The extreme points are all adjacent on the hexagon;
2. Two extreme points are adjacent;
3. None of the extreme points are adjacent.
These are investigated in turn.
1. All adjacent: Suppose w = αf4+βf7+γf8, for some α+β+γ = 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0,
γ ≥ 0.3 Then, P(1|B3) = α; P(3|B2) = 1, and P(2|B1) = β. Stochastic WARP
fails iﬀ all three probabilities are greater than one-half or less than one-half. They
cannot all be less (since 1 > 1/2), and they cannot be all greater, since α > 1/2
and β > 1/2 cannot both hold.
2. Two adjacent: Suppose w = αf4 + βf5 + γf8. Then P(1|B3) = α; P(3|B2) =
α + γ = 1 − β; P(2|B1) = β. Since both β and 1 − β cannot simultaneously be
less than or greater than 1/2, stochastic WARP holds.
3. None adjacent: Suppose w = αf2 + βf5 + γf8. Then P(1|B3) = α; P(3|B2) = γ;
P(2|B1) = β. If, for example, α = β = γ = 1/3, stochastic WARP would fail.
￿
The intuition for why stochastic WARP is not necessarily satisﬁed when using
choice functions that correspond to extreme points that are not adjacent can be
obtained by examining those functions. There are two such groups: {f1,f4,f7} and
{f2,f5,f8}. Taken together, each group forms a “cycle” in that there is a one-to-one
mapping between a function in the group and a good which is never selected by that
function. So randomizing over those functions is itself a form of inconsistency, which
is revealed not at any point in time, but by viewing the choice behavior over time as
a whole.
4 Conclusion
The standard normative justiﬁcation for the use of transitive preferences is that
intransitivities in preferences make an agent subject to systematic exploitation. How-
ever, the conditions for that systematic exploitation are, in some sense, relatively
unlikely to occur. It is possible to create suitable conditions once such a cycle is
3The notation for choice functions is abused slightly to also represent the points on the simplex.
6identiﬁed; but this assumes a level of detailed information about the preferences or
behavior of an individual that seems implausible.
The results in this paper complement previous results of Epstein and Kim in
aﬃrming that incorporating the use of “intransitive” behaviors does not add to the
set of possible consumption choices in a setting where apparent preference reversals
might seem to be potentially useful. There is no feasible pattern of consumption in
this model that cannot be obtained with behavior that the observer would classify
as being transitive, at least in a stochastic sense. Thus, there is no sense in which a
decision-maker would strictly beneﬁt, in terms of the resulting choice outcomes, by
appearing to behave “intransitively.” Consistency in this setting is not the hobgoblin
of the rational agent’s mind.
The focus of this analysis is on the feasibility of attaining any given outcome;
thus, information about the environment does not play a signiﬁcant role. Relaxing
the informational assumptions is one route to justifying why observed behavior might
appear inconsistent. Vega-Redondo (1995) presents a dynamic model of decision-
making in which agents have imprecise impressions of the outcomes possible from
the available actions, and discusses the extent to which a rationally learning agent
will appear to be consistent.
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Figure 1: Feasible consumption bundles as a function of the budget set probabilities.
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